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KATZENBACH V. McCLUNG REVISITED: 
HOW THE RENQUIST AND ROBERTS COURTS WOULD 




Sharlene A. McEvoy** 
I. Introduction 
Consider the following hypothetical. 
A vegetarian living in a small coastal New England town 
decides to open a restaurant, named Veggies, that only serves 
salads and soups. The freshness of these menu options is going 
to be Veggie's biggest selling point and it advertises 
accordingly: nothing processed, canned or shipped from out of 
state will do. To ensure freshness, Veggies negotiates supply 
contracts with local farn1ers all within the state. 
*BA Western New England College, J.D. Pace University 
School of Law, M.A. Fairfield University. She is a practicing 
attorney in Manhattan. 
**Professor of Business Law, Charles F. Dolan School of 
Business, Fairfield University. 
***This article arose from an Independent Study conducted by 
Attorney Jannetty who is the primary author of this article. Dr. 
McEvoy suggested the topic which arose out of a discussion in 
the course The Supreme Court in the 1960's. McEvoy 
presented the paper at the 2012 NEALSB meeting and edited 
the article for publication. 
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The restaurant is going to be based in an old farmhouse on 
private property that is visible from the road, but several miles 
from the closest highway. All of the furniture and decor is 
purchased locally. 
There's just one snag: Veggies will not serve customers who 
are known for being racist. It is located in rural area with 
parochial racial views, and as certain clientele have been turned 
away, claims have started swirling that Veggies is engaging in 
discriminatory practices. As claims have grown to harassment, 
Veggies files a lawsuit seeking declaratory judgment that it has 
the right to decline service at its sole discretion. Miraculously, 
the case has made' its way to the Supreme Court and will be 
heard in the upcoming session. What will the outcome be? 
Counsel for the protestors rely heavily upon the 1964 Supreme 
Court decision of Katzen bach v. McClung in which the owner 
of Ollie's BBQ sought a declaratory judgment that he did not 
have to serve blacks in his privately owned, local restaurant 
despite the passage ofthe Civil Rights Act of 19641• 
Since its opening, Ollie's had a policy of only allowing whites 
to be served indoors, restricting service for blacks to a take-out 
window. The restaurant was located 11 blocks from an 
interstate on a state highway and even further away from any 
railroad or bus station. 2 In the year prior to passage of the Act, 
Ollie's had purchased approximately $150,000 of food locally, 
46% of which was meat purchased from a local retailer who 
had obtained it from an out of state third party supplier. 3 
Despite passage of the law, Ollie's announced its intent to 
continue its discriminatory practices, believing that forced 
compliance would result in the Joss of business, as it catered to 
mainly local, white families who would decline to eat with 
blacks in the dining room. 4 
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The Supreme Court unanimously held that Ollie's 
BBQ's refusal to serve blacks was unconstitutional and in 
violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which barred racial 
discrimination at any restaurant that serves or offers to serve 
food to interstate travelers or that obtains a substantial amount 
of food that has moved in interstate commerce. 5 The Court 
stated that the Act was enforceable against Ollie's because it 
was participating in interstate commerce, which fell under 
Congress's power to regulate through the Commerce Clause. 6 
Counsel for Veggie's would argue that the Katzenbach 
decision wrongly assigned an overly expansive view of the 
Commerce Clause for purposes of remedying a social ill and 
that Ollie's operated on a primarily local basis and therefore 
should not have been subject to regulation by Congress, whose 
regulatory power is limited to interstate economic activities. 
Because Veggies is operating in a similar fashion, it should be 
exempt from regulation by Congress under a proper 
interpretation of the Commerce Clause. That the holding in 
Katzenbach is specious is strengthened by subsequent cases 
where Congress's ability to legislate policy through the 
Commerce Clause was denied by the Court, in United States v. 
Lopez and United States v. Morrison, in which the Supreme 
Court struck down acts of Congress holding that the Commerce 
Clause did not grant Congress a police power to regulate any 
economic activity that it could only tenuously connect to 
interstate commerce. 
While many scholars concede that Katzenbach played a 
critical role in combating the rampant racism in America at that 
time, others argue the decision ranks among the most flawed in 
Supreme Court history. Would the outcome be the same if the 
Supreme Court decided Katzenbach today? The thesis of this 
article is the Katzenbach was wrongly decided based on the 
clear meaning of the Commerce Clause, which does not allow 
Congress to regulate economic activities that are local in nature. 
This article will examine the legal missteps ofthe Warren 
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Court in improperly expanding the Commerce Clause to 
regulate local economic activity. 
II. Expansive Interpretations ofthe Commerce Clause 
In the 1942 decision of Wickard v. Filburn, the Court 
determined that Congress had the authority to regulate 
economic activity through the Commerce Clause. 7 This Clause 
applies only to economic activities if they are interstate in 
nature, that is, if they involve activities that cross state lines. 8 
An Ohio wheat farmer, Roscoe Filburn, brought suit against 
Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wickard, contesting the 
constitutionality of the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 
and its penalties. 9 The law mandated limitations on the amount 
of wheat each farmer could produce, calculated on a per 
acreage basis, to prevent overages or shortages that would 
cause market prices to fluctuate. 10 
Prior to passage of the law, Filburn had planed a winter 
. 1 II A . d crop of wheat for personal and commercia use. s requtre 
by law, he was notified prior to the 1941 planting that his 
assigned wheat cror was fixed at 20.1 bushels for each of his 
11.1 allotted acres. 2 Ignoring this restriction, he sowed 23 
acres in the winter of 1940, resulting in an "overproduction" of 
239 bushels. Under the Act, this overproduction constituted 
"marketing excess" which resulted in a penalty of 49 cents per 
excess bushel. 13 
Filburn refused to pay the penalty and to deliver the 
excess wheat to the Secretary of Agriculture. 14 He filed a 
lawsuit to enjoin enforcement of the Act and sought a 
declaratory judgment that the law unconstitutionally exceeded 
Congress's power to regulate commerce. 15 The federal district 
court determined that Filburn was not subject to the amended 
Act because it would impose retroactive penalties in violation 
16 ofthe Fifth Amendment and thus found them unenforceable. 
The decision was based primarily on comments made by 
Wickard during a mid-day radio address to wheat farmers 
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which few heard because of the time it was broadcast. 17 The 
Secretary appealed to the Supreme Court. 18 
Filburn argued that his production of wheat for personal 
consumption was beyond the power of Congress to regulate 
through the Commerce Clause, as his production was "local" in 
character and any effect that his production had on interstate 
"' d' " b 19 commerce was m Irect at est. The government countered 
that the Act was aimed at regulating the sa le and prices of 
wheat, and not its production or consumption, which it could 
do under the Commerce Clause. 20 In addition, it argued that 
the Act was "sustainable as a ' necessary and proper' 
implementation of the power of Congress over interstate 
commerce. " 21 
After a lengthy analysis of the Commerce clause, the 
Court determined that economic activities appearing local in 
nature could still be subject to legislative regulation if they 
have an impact on interstate commerce through repetition. 
What if other farn1ers ignored the law as Filburn did? 22 The 
Court noted that Filburn's act of growing excess wheat for 
personal consumption, if considered in the aggregate, could 
substantially affect both the price and availability of wheat on 
the market. 23 
The Warren Court relied heavily upon Wickard in 
Katzenbach. Like Filbum, McClung, the owner of Ollie's 
BBQ, sought a declaratory judgment that an Act of Congress 
based on the Commerce Clause was unconstitutional. 24 
McClung sued to enjoin the government from forcing him to 
comply with Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which 
states that persons could not be turned away on discriminatory 
grounds from restaurants that served or offered to serve food to 
interstate travelers or if they obtained a substantial amount of 
food through interstate commerce. 25 
The district court determined that Ollie's was not 
subject to regulation by the Act, as Congress had " legislated a 
conclusive presumption that a restaurant affects interstate 
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commerce if it serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or if 
a substantial rortion of the food which it serves has moved in 
commerce."2 The Court determined that such legislation was 
inappropriate because Congress had failed to establish a 
"demonstrable connection" between the meat obtained from 
out of state by the third party retailer and the conclusion that 
Ollie's discriminatory practices would affect interstate 
commerce."27 Thus, Ollie's was granted the injunction and 
declaratory judgment that its policy of race-based service was 
not subject to regulation by the Civil Rights Act of I 964. 28 
The government appealed, and the case went to the 
Supreme Court. In evaluating whether Ollie's was subject to 
the Act, Justice Clark, writing for the majority, discussed the 
findings of the extensive congressional hearings, which 
included an abundance of testimony indicating that racial 
discrimination at restaurants had acted as a deterrent for many 
blacks, who then choose to spend their money elsewhere 
resulting in lower profits for certain restaurants. 29 In tum, 
these restaurants purchased Jess food from the market. 30 There 
was also testimony that discrimination in restaurants had a 
significant impact on interstate travel, as blacks were prevented 
from purchasing food while traveling except at undesirable 
locations, and would avoid travel rather than risk being 
subjected to discrimination.31 In addition, both new businesses 
and black, skilled workers were deterred from settling in areas 
where racial discrimination at restaurants was rampant because, 
as the Court pointed out, "one can hardly travel \'.ithout . ,,p eatmg. -
Despite these findings, counsel for Ollie's argued that 
Congress had overstepped its bounds by attempting to regulate 
the activity of all restaurants rather than evaluating each on a 
case-by-case basis. 33 Instead, Ollie's argued that Congress 
"arbitrarily created a conclusive presumption that all 
restaurants meeting the criteria set out in the Act 'affect 
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commerce,"' which, it argued, was inappropriate in this 
instance because Ollie's was operating solely on a local basis. 34 
The Court was not persuaded and reversed the lower 
court's decision. Based on Wickard v. Filbum, it determined 
that the economic impact of the food purchased by Ollie's was 
insignificant, but if other restaurants followed suit, the effect 
on interstate commerce would be great. 35 
The Court determined that as long as Congress had a 
rational basis for its legislation, it could act in a preventative 
manner. 36 Because the record of congressional hearings was 
replete with indications that racial discrimination in restaurants 
already existed and was spreading and would presumably have 
a negative effect on interstate commerce, the Court specifically 
noted that "Congress was not required to await the total 
dislocation of commerce" prior to taking action. 37 Thus, the 
Court held that "where we find that the legislators, in light of 
the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for 
finding a chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection 
of commerce, our investigation is at an end."38 Furthermore, 
the Court reiterated its prior holding in Wickard v. Filbum, 
specifically stating that the power of Congress did extend to 
local activities "even if[the] activity [is] local and though it 
may not be regarded as commerce ... if it exerts a substantial 
. f'fi . " 39 econom1c e ect on mterstate commerce. 
Ill. Controlling the Breadth of the Commerce Clause 
Consider what the outcome of Katzen bach would have 
been had it been decided by the Supreme Court thirty-one years 
later. In 1995, the Court issued a ruling in U.S. v. Lopez, 
striking down the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990, a law 
?rohibited the possession of a gun ?Jounds or 
wtthm I ,000 feet of a school. as unconstltutwnal. The law 
was premised upon the notion that the presence of guns in 
school zones negatively affects the interstate commerce in two 
ways: 1) necessitating higher insurance premiums that must be 
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carried by the population, and 2) deterring travel to parts of the 
country deemed as unsafe. 41 
The Supreme Court rejected these contentions, 
determining that gun possession within a school zone could not 
even remotely be classified as an economic activity subject to 
regulation by Congress through the Commerce Clause because 
such possession, even when considered in the aggregate, does 
not substantially affect interstate commerce. 42 The majority 
opinion, authored by Chief Justice Rehnquist and joined by 
Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, noted the 
danger in allowing Congress to legislate through the 
Commerce Clause where the connection to interstate 
commerce is tenuous, 'writing "[t]o uphold the Government's 
contentions here, we would have to pile inference upon 
inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert 
congressional authority under the Commerce Clause to a 
general police power of the sort retained by the States."43 
The Court analyzed the enumeralion of powers among 
the separate branches of government, cautioning that giving 
Congress free rein to legislate any activity it cold vaguely 
connect to interstate commerce would "effectually obliterate 
ihe distinction between what is national and what is local and 
create a completely centralized government."44 In addition to 
warning against acts of Congress that would foster the creation 
of a centralized, rather than enumerated, national government, 
the Court also made the significant point that if it were to allow 
Congress to invoke the power of the Commerce Clause in an 
unchecked manner, it would be "hard pressed to posit any 
activity by an individual that Congress is without power to 
regulate," such as telling local restaurants whom it must 
.. -serve. ' Consequently, the 0 un-Free School Zone Act of 1990 
was declared unconstitutional. 
In a concurring opinion, Justices Kennedy and 
O'Connor took the majority position one step further arguing 
that to allow Congress to legislate through the Commerce 
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Clause, despite a weak connection between the regulated 
activity and interstate commerce, would result in the 
destruction of government accountability. Permitting Congress 
to legislate in an unimpeded manner would not only "[blur] the 
boundaries between the spheres of federal and state authority." 
but it would also result in the ''inability to hold either branch of 
the government answerable to the citizens [which is] more 
dangerous even than devolving too much authority to the 
remote central power. " 46 Justice Kennedy also discussed at 
length the Framers' intent in crafting the Constitution by 
creating a government marked by separation of powers and 
checks and balances, not a centralized government controlled 
by Congress. 47 The Court therefore should, through judicial 
review, protect the enumeration of powers prescribed by the 
Constitution, which it failed to do in Wickard and 
Katzen bach. 48 
In another concurring opinion, Justice Thomas 
observed "our case law has drifted far from the original 
understanding of the Commerce Clause," remarking the hope 
that "in a future case, we ought to temper our Commerce 
Clause jurisprudence in a manner that both makes sense of our 
more recent case law and is more faithful to ... that Clause."49 
That jurisprudence would make clear that Congress does not 
have regulatory police power and, in fact, that there are real 
limits to the scope of its power to legislate. 50 hnportantly, he 
reminded that where the Constitution was meant to grant 
authority to Congress to regulate interstate commerce, it 
contains a specifically enumerated power, such as the power to 
coin money and the power to establish post offices and roads. 51 
Had the Framers intended for Congress to regulate nearly all 
economic activities, they would have delineated such intentions 
along with the other powers specifically reserved for Congress. 
The fact that the Constitution contains no such enumeration is 
both paramount and instructive. Congress should be prevented 
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from acting as though it has the police power under the guise of 
regulating interstate commerce. 
Without question the Katzenbach decision would have 
been decided differently by the Lopez Court. Certainly those 
Justices that joined in the majority opinion in Lopez would 
agree, that just as one would be hard pressed to find a 
connection between guns in school zones and interstate 
commerce, one would be similarly hard pressed to find a 
connection between a small town restaurant that caters to a 
local clientele and interstate commerce. The Lopez majority 
specifica1ly rejected the argument that guns in school zones 
negatively affected travel and deterred new settlement as a 
means of classifying guns in school zones as an economic 
activity. These same arguments regarding travel and 
settlement were accepted by the Warren Court in 
Katzenbach. 52 In 1995. they would have been rejected by the 
Renquist court. 
The only potential connection between Ollie's BBQ 
and interstate commerce was that so{ne of its meat was 
procured from a local buyer who received it from an out of 
state third party. This connection is just as tenuous, if not more, 
than the contention that guns school zones will result in higher 
insurance premiums and a decrease in travel. Ollie's owner did 
not travel out of state to purchase any food nor did he 
knowingly contract with any out of state suppliers. The fact 
that a local supplier with whom he had a relationship tended to 
secure meat from out of state was not a conscious act by Ollie 
to conduct business across state lines. 
Furthennore, as highlighted by Justice Thomas's 
concurring opinion in Lopez, Congress' action would surely be 
likened to a police power if afforded the power to dictate who 
restaurateurs are required to serve on their private property 
absent any substantial connection between the restaurant's 
activity and interstate commerce. Even if considered in the 
aggregate, a restaurant's selection of patrons does not rise to 
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the level necessary for Congress to have the authority to 
regulate in protection of interstate commerce. At worst, those 
local patrons that know they will not be pern1itted to dine in 
one restaurant will either spend their money at a grocery store 
or go to a different restaurant. The fact that everyone needs to 
eat was a point that was ironically and mistakenly used by the 
Warren Court in support of its decision to uphold the Act 
against Ollie's BBQ. Either way, money spent on food is 
entering a market, leading to the conclusion that interstate 
commerce is not substantially affected by a local restaurant's 
practices, however discriminatory they may be. The Rehnquist 
Court would not have maintained the connection recognized by 
the Warren Court between the meat and interstate commerce 
and, if the same line of reasoning applied in Lopez was applied 
in Katzenbach, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 would have been 
struck down as applied to Ollie's BBQ. 
The Rehnquist Court's 2000 decision in U.S. v. 
Morrison reached a conclusion similar to that in Lopez 
regarding Congress's ability to legislate through the Commerce 
Clause. ln Morrison, Rehnquist writing for the majority and 
joined by O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy and Thomas, struck 
down the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 as 
unconstitutional, determining that the violent act of rape was 
not an economic activity and Congress's attempt to regulate it 
d d . 53 excee e tts power. 
The opinion made several references to the decision in 
Lopez, specifically noting that it applied to the fact that the 
Commerce Clause could not be used by Congress to regulate 
activities that were noneconomic in nature, even if when 
considered in the aggregate, it could have an indirect economic 
impact. 54 Although the government relied upon evidence 
compiled in congressional hearings indicating that rape 
deterred interstate travel and business, diminished national 
productivity, and resulted in increased medical costs, the Court 
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rejected these findings as virtually having the effect of 
classifying rape as an economic activity. 55 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Tliomas again 
stressed that the state of modem case law with respect to 
defining the scope of the Commerce Clause had diverged 
greatly from its original understanding and early case law. 56 
He referred to his opinion in Lopez to note that"[ u ]ntil this 
Court replaces its existing Commerce Clause jurisprudence 
with a standard more consistent with the original understanding, 
we will continue to see Congress appropriating state police 
d h . f I . ,s7 powers un er t e gutse o regu atmg commerce. 
Following this line of reasoning it is clear that Congress 
does not have the police power to remedy social ills such as 
gun violence in school zones, violence against women, or the 
discriminatory actions of a private, local restaurant. The 
Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the ability to 
disregard the Constitution's enumeration of powers. Nor does 
it afford Congress the authority to legislate in areas that are 
specifically reserved for regulation by the states, or that are not 
subject to legislation at all, such as the activities of a business 
such as Ollie's BBQ. 
The majority in Morrison thus would likely overturn the 
holding of the Warren Court in Katzenbach. A local 
restaurant's activities, irrespective of whether it deterred travel, 
incidentally resulted in lower profits that led to fewer 
purchases by the restaurant, or resulted in deterred settlement 
to the area, are just that: local. They cannot be viewed as an 
interstate economic activity if its practices, so far as conducted 
by the restaurant, are local. Nor can they be viewed in the 
aggregate so as to elevate their practices from being local in 
nature to being interstate. 
Even more persuasive is the Morrison majority's 
reference to the Civil Rights Cases, five cases heard 
collectively by the Supreme Court in 1883.58 Several African-
Americans filed suit claiming discrimination by theatres, hotels, 
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and transit companies in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 
1875. The Supreme Court held that Congress lacked the 
authority to outlaw racial discrimination by private individuals 
and organizations or to regulate any non-state based 
discrimination. 59 Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley 
directed that '' [i]t would be running the slavery argument into 
the ground to make it apply to every act of discrimination 
which a person may see tit to make as to the guests he will 
entertain, or as to the people he will take into his coach or cab 
or car, or admit to his concert or theater, or deal with in other 
matters of intercourse or business. " 60 While laws can be 
enacted to protect against discrimination by a state or federal 
body or agency, such as discrimination by police officers or on 
public transportation, no such law can dictate whether one 
chooses to discriminate on their O\vn property, such as in their 
home or car. This decision has never been overturned. In fact, 
the majority in Morrison notes its "'enduring viability. " 61 
lt is safe to say that if the Morrison majority had 
decided Katzenbach, the result would have been different. It is 
doubtful that the Court would determine that the business of 
Ollie's BBQ affected interstate commerce or that the Court 
would instruct Ollie's, a privately owned, local restaurant, 
about whom it must accept as patrons. Although Ollie 's 
practices were morally objectionable, they were not illegal or 
subject to rt!gulation by Congress. The Warren Court failed to 
appreciate, or perhaps refused to acknowledge. these 
differences, choosing instead to issue a unanimous decision not 
based on the controlling principles outlined in the Constitution. 
lV. The Roberts Court 
What ifthe Roberts Court were to hear Katzenbach 
today? Would the outcome have been similar to that reached 
by the Rehnquist Court in Lopez and Morrison? Justices Scalia, 
Thomas and Kennedy, who all joined in the majority opinions 
in Lopez and Morrison, are still on the Court. Thus, only two 
more votes would be needed to overturn Katzenbach. 
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Justice Roberts would be one of these votes because he 
indicated his agreement with the Lopez decision during the 
hearings before the Judiciary Committee in 2003, during which 
he stated "[i]t's not a question of an abstract fact, does this 
affect interstate commerce or not, but has his body, the 
Congress, demonstrated the impact on interstate commerce that 
drove them to legislate? That's a very important factor. It 
wasn't present in Lopez at all. " 62 It would seem that he, too, 
would agree that a tenuous connection between the regulated 
activity and interstate commerce is not enough to support 
legislation under the Commerce Clause. 
The second vote would likely come from Justice Alito, 
who authored a lengthy dissenting opinion in United States v. 
Rybar during his tenure on the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit. 63 He wrote that he would have struck 
down congressional legislation banning private citizens from 
owning submachine guns on the same grounds as outlined in 
Lopez, noting that to regulate activities that are clearly local in 
nature absent any actual or established connection to interstate 
commerce under the guise of the Commerce Clause was an 
unconstitutional expansion ofCongress's power. 64 His opinion 
opens with the poignant, obviously rhetorical question, "Was 
U.S. v. Lopez a constitutional freak? Or did it signify that the 
Commerce Clause still imposes some meaningful limits on 
congressional power?"65 He also discussed the importance of 
preserving federalism as discussed in Lopez, reminding that the 
sensitive balance between state and federal power should be 
respected. 66 
V. Conclusion 
Katzenbach v. McClung was a unanimous decision 
based on a moral and ethical grounds regarding race, not a 
legal sound interpretation of the Constitution or the powers it 
affords to Congress. The court decision was clearly a policy-
making one than one aimed at correctly interpreting the law. 
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The outcome of Katzen bach is unsurprising, having 
been before the Court only a decade after the landmark 
decision of Brown v. Board of Education at a time when the 
social ills of racism were still plaguing the country. It was one 
of several decisions in a decade where unanimity on issues of 
racial equality was of paramount concern to the Court. 
However, the interpretation of the law and a government 
defined by separation of powers, rather than a centralized 
police power, should not have been sacrificed for purposes of 
combating racism. Congress does not have the authority to 
regulate private activities on private property. Just as the 
government cannot force a private citizen to allow persons he 
finds objectionable into his private home, it cannot force 
Ollie's BBQ to serve blacks or force Veggies to serve racists in 
its local, privately owned restaurant. More recent 
interpretations of the Commerce Clause reveal that there are 
limits to Congress's power to legislate, and those limitations 
should certainly be recognized in Veggie's case. 
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